

Psychological and Ethical Hedonism in Oscar Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray*

Atefe Karami Torkashvand^{1*} and Leila Baradaran Jamili²

1- MA of English Language and Literature, Boroujerd Branch, Islamic Azad University, Boroujerd, Iran

2- Assistant Professor of English Language and Literature, Boroujerd Branch, Islamic Azad University, Boroujerd, Iran

Corresponding author: Atefe Karami Torkashvand

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates psychological and ethical hedonism in Oscar Wilde's (1854-1900) *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1891), as an unsatisfying method of living. This philosophy has been recommended as the way of finding the best way to happiness and a good life. From the first day of the history of human's existence to the present time, 'pleasure' has been one of the highest goals, and what has given form to human's behavior. Pleasure is the indispensable principle of the philosophy of Hedonism. Wilde was an intelligent Irish writer, poet, essayist, dandy, playwright, novelist, and epigrammatist. *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, as a dark, sardonic, gothic and supernatural novel, was the topic of much controversy at time. The novel is one of the best examples of hedonism which shows the start of seeking, and experiencing kinds of pleasure; moreover, it offers some outcomes of using it in the most artistic and aesthetic way. This paper will discuss the smooth transformation of the protagonist in details. Wilde designated hedonism in *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, by injecting the idea of seeking pleasure into the protagonist's mind and life. Dorian Gray follows hedonism and gives freedom to all his desires, and seeks any kind of pleasure. Accordingly the outcome of living a pleasure-based life would be the subject of considerable thinking and discussion.

Keywords: Ethical Hedonism, Happiness, Hedonism, Psychological Hedonism, Unsatisfying Method.

INTRODUCTION

The first tendency of man is to spend the energy to which he is endowed, in building up for himself an ordered world of customs, institutions, and laws. A man throws himself into some pursuit. The accumulation of a fortune for himself and his family, the achievement of fame as a man of science, an artist, or a thinker; but the assumption in all of these cases is what he seeks is worth striving for, and the life he lives worth living. Therefore, there is an individual "sitting down in a calm moment to think" (qtd. in Watson 2), and when the thought takes the form of the question, what would be the end of life, one may be sure that the energy and enthusiasm of youth is spent, and has been succeeded by the sober reflection of mature years. Happiness is doubtlessly the end which all men seek, but it is an end which no man ever attained, or can attain.

Traditionally there are two types of hedonism: "psychological" and "ethical" (Audi 133). Indeed, there are many types of hedonism based on different definitions of pleasure. These definitions are surely different, but they all have something in common. Something that places them under the category of hedonism, that something is no doubt pleasure. They all have pleasure as the first, basic and most important element in shaping the theory. The basic element is the goal. What makes them different to reject each other is the different definition of pleasure each one has.

Born on October 16, 1854 in Dublin, Wilde is famed for his novel *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (PDG). This paper aims at defining two types of hedonism and then uses them practically in the story of Dorian Gray's life. At first step definitions of psychological and ethical hedonism are suggested to clarify the intention of using these terms. Later the difficulties of these two types will be discussed in detail. Afterward the researchers bring some arguments against the psychological and ethical hedonism in order to illustrate the discussed terms in this research more. Finally all the

discussed theories will be applied to the novel and especially in the main character's life. Dorian and his aesthetic fall into the pleasure can be a perfect example of theories regarded in this research; therefore, a vast notion will be on his life, actions, and consequences of his actions.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Hedonism collectively believes that everybody should get "pleasure" as much as possible in "his life" (qtd. in Feldman 13). In other words the happiness in one's life can be defined based on the amount of pleasures he achieved. Watson describes hedonism and claims that the ultimate goal in human life should be achieving happiness:

The first tendency of man is to expend the pent-up energy with which he is endowed, in building up for himself an ordered world of customs, institutions, and laws. And what is true of the race is also true of the individual. A man throws himself into some pursuit: the accumulation of a fortune for himself and his family, the ascent of political or social power, the achievement of fame as a man of science, an artist, or a thinker; but he assumes in all of these cases that what he seeks is worth striving for, and the life he lives worth living. It may be sure that the energy and enthusiasm of youth is spent, and has been succeeded by the sober reflection of maturer years. Happiness is doubtless the end which all men seek, but it is an end which no man ever attained, or can attain. (2)

Hedonism motivates people to do their best for reaching happiness, joy, delight, and bliss in their life. Traditionally, hedonism is divided into two types: psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism. The psychological hedonist says that as a matter of psychological fact, people are always motivated by the eternal desire to gain pleasure, either short-term or long-term one. The ethical hedonist says two things: first, that the only state of affairs that is good for its own sake is pleasure, that is nothing is good unless it is itself a pleasure or a means of producing pleasure; second, that one should act for the sake of producing maximum pleasure either for oneself or for people in general.

The two types of hedonism are distinct but obviously related. If pleasure alone is desired and desirable for its own sake as psychological hedonism indicates, then it seems to be the only good as the first tenet of ethical hedonism holds. Therefore one can say that an object, activity, or state is good that is to say at least it is desirable. If pleasure is the only good, then it also seems natural, though not absolutely necessary, to hold that one ought to produce as much pleasure as possible, for oneself or for people in general as possible as the second tenet of ethical hedonism notes.

The first point to notice is that there is no feature or quality held in common by all states or activities called 'pleasure.' As Aristotle has pointed out, there are "different kinds of pleasures human beings enjoy" (qtd. in Rudebusch 404). Aristotle held that pleasure is the experiential aspect of a fulfilling activity or state, and that as there are distinct types of activities or states, so there are distinct types of pleasure. Perhaps it is true that people should pursue pleasure only as an aspect of a fulfilling activity or condition. However people do not always regard pleasure, or a pleasurable situation or sensation, as only all aspects of a fulfilling activity. There are other types of pleasure in addition to this type.

Accordingly there is another classification through which one can divide pleasures into three types. The first type is illustrated by the pleasure one takes in acquiring philosophical knowledge, listening to a concert, or engaging in a rewarding conversation with a friend. Such pleasures are not bodily sensations, and they cannot be located in specific parts of one's body.

Instead, they are, in some way, the experiential aspects of other activities. They are not just the activities, however, for one can perform various fulfilling activities, such as digestion without such activities being pleasant. To be pleasant, an activity must involve one's consciousness of it, and perhaps include attention toward it. However, a mere awareness of the activity does not seem of itself to be a pleasure: one can be neutrally, or quite indifferently, aware of good things happening to oneself and to others. This first type of pleasure can be described, then, as the conscious delight in an activity or state. Aristotle's analysis of pleasure can be applied most aptly to this type. Virtuous persons find morally good actions pleasant; vicious persons take pleasure in revenge or power, as well as other activities or conditions. In this sense, pleasure, as Aristotle pointed out, refers to the experiential aspect or consequence of an activity, and it is not the good itself, but a consequence of possessing the good or apparent good; though pleasure of this sort is a good, when it is a consequence of possessing a real good. Apparent good can be added, because someone can take pleasure in something that is not really or totally good, but merely apparently good is one type of pleasure, but one can hold that one's delight can be misdirected. This first type of pleasure can be called conscious enjoyment.

The second type of pleasure is illustrated by the relief the office employee feels when the five o'clock whistle blows, or the relief one feels when any difficult job is completed. In addition to passive and active pleasure there is

that which shall be called pleasure of satisfaction or contentedness. It is the pleasure which one feels at getting that which one desires or needs or wants

–irrespective of whether the desired thing by itself gives one pleasure.

Thus, doing forty push-ups or solving a crossword puzzle may not be in themselves pleasant, but completing those tasks is a distinct type of pleasure. Again, the pleasure does not consist in a particular, localizable sensation, though the experience may be accompanied by some sensations. Nor is the activity itself particularly pleasant, or the cause of pleasure as in the first type of pleasure. Rather, this pleasure consists in the satisfaction of a desire. One might group this type together with the first type of pleasure. For this type of pleasure seems to be a conscious delight, not in the activity itself, like the other type-one pleasures, but in its completion. This second type of pleasure would be called satisfaction of a desire.

The third type of pleasure is a bodily sensation. This is illustrated by the pleasurable experiences of the taste of a fruit, the feel of a warm bath. One important difference between this type and the others is that, more frequently than in the other types, at times men seem to desire the pleasure itself rather than the activity that the pleasure accompanies. The primary object of desire in the first type is usually the activity one is consciously delighting in; the primary object of desire in the second type is the object of another, first-order desire. In this third type, however, it seems, in many instances, that the primary object of desire is the pleasure itself. For example, one can desire the taste itself of an apple. Pleasure can be defined as a conscious, agreeable feeling, which is an appetitive reaction to some other activities or conditions, a satisfaction of a desire, or a specific sensation.

DIFFICULTIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL HEDONISM

The first difficulty with ethical hedonism emerges from a consideration of psychological hedonism. Psychological hedonism is the claim that the only things desired for their own sake are pleasures. However, at least sometimes men desire objects distinct from pleasure as understood in any of the three types mentioned above. It is obvious that not all of men's actions are for the sake of type-three pleasure. Almost everyone will grant that at least some of his actions are motivated, in some way, by other experiences or states of affairs. Someone's choice maybe to work on a mathematical problem which has no foreseeable practical use. If asked why he works the mathematical problem, the person might say simply, because he or she enjoys doing it. The psychological hedonist might welcome such an answer. He or she might argue that this person works on the problems precisely for the sake of the pleasure he gets from them, and so his or her desire is, after all, simply a desire for seeking pleasure. However, the pleasure he or she desires is of type-two; that is, it is the pleasure that consists in the satisfaction of a desire for something else; it will be a second-form desire, depending on some first-form of desire. But this first-type of desire is certainly not directed to pleasure. That is, one could not obtain pleasure from the satisfaction of the desire for the solution of a scientific problem unless one first desired that solution; and that desire is a desire for a state which is distinct from pleasure. Therefore, there are objects or states of affairs other than pleasure that are desired for their own sake.

There is a necessary connection between desire and pleasure, but the connection is not that pleasure is desire's object; rather, obtaining what one desires, which is a condition or activity distinct from pleasure, and it results in pleasure. Psychological hedonists confuse these connections. The error of psychological hedonism is that it mistakes the connection between the satisfaction of desire and pleasure, for a necessary connection between desire and pleasure as its object. Desire is intrinsically connected to what is good: while not everything desired is genuinely good, what is naturally good is the fitting object of desire. Therefore the primary object of desire, what one naturally desires on the first level before desiring to satisfy a desire, is at least in many cases, not pleasure, but a condition or activity through which pleasure is gained.

This argument does not refute ethical hedonism. Someone could still hold that when people act for states other than pleasure for its own sake, they are just mistaken. However, the fact that psychological hedonism is mistaken strongly suggests, or provides strong evidence for, the proposition that ethical hedonism is false; that is, that pleasure is not the only non-instrumental good. The fact that people do act for the sake of knowledge, moral uprightness, play, friendship, and other objects and do not treat these objects as means to pleasure is strong evidence that people grasp something intrinsically worthwhile in those objects.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL HEDONISM: QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCES AMONG PLEASURES

There is another difficulty with ethical hedonism. It is often argued that there clearly are qualitative differences among pleasures, but such qualitative differences implicitly suppose some criteria other than pleasure itself by which to rank the qualitatively different types, and so pleasure cannot be the only intrinsic good. This argument is often advanced in the context of discussions of John Stuart Mill's (1806-1873) modification of the hedonism he inherited from Jeremy Bentham (1748- 1832). Bentham was a pure and quantitative hedonist: what counts is pleasure and pleasure alone. If one action will produce a greater amount of pleasure than another, taking into account various factors such as

intensity, duration, and number of people experiencing it, then that action should be done. Bentham explicitly denied that the quality of a pleasure should be deliberated; only its quantity is important. A Benthamite might believe that the experience of reading William Shakespeare with understanding will always have a greater quantity of pleasure than any other physical experience.

However, one supposes that there is a comparison among the Shakespeare reading with some other forms of pleasure. If there is only a quantitative difference between pleasures, then even some number of physical pleasures will outweigh the Shakespeare reading. For Mill, it seems that the quality of the pleasure should be considered, as well as its quantity. This was Mill's modification: It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. In this comparison quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

Thus, in response to critics of hedonism, a dissatisfied Socrates is still better than a satisfied fool. Thus there are qualitative differences among pleasures. Yet, it is often argued that this admission is implicitly a denial of hedonism itself. If the first action of a person has more, or an equal amount of, pleasure than the second action, and yet the second one is more valuable than first one, it cannot be a proper pleasure since it is more valuable. The second action must be better than the first one with respect to some features or criteria distinct from pleasure.

In his defense of a qualitative hedonism, Rem Edwards a professor of philosophy replied to the preceding argument by denying that one type of pleasurable experience can be meaningfully said to have the same, or a greater, amount of pleasure as another type of pleasurable experience.

In other words, according to Edwards, two experiences "can differ qua pleasure; that is, quaexperience or feeling without being quantifiably comparable" (qtd. in Lee and George 101). Edwards still holds that what is intrinsically valuable is a quality of experiencing an agreeable feeling but he holds that there are irreducibly distinct types of agreeable feelings.

In the way it is usually presented, the argument against hedonism based on qualitative differences among pleasures is unsuccessful. However, the argument can be amended so that, even if it does not strictly demonstrate that hedonism is false, it does cast considerable doubt on it.

Edwards's answer to the standard version of the argument is that two pleasures can be qualitatively different, but not on the basis of something other than pleasure. But in order for hedonism to make sense, this claim must not only have a self-contradiction; it must actually be true. The claim does not appear to be self-contradictory and still, it does not seem to fit the facts. It seems that people very often rank different pleasures on the basis of the activities or their consequence conditions, rather than only on the pleasures derived from them. The experience one has of knowledge or understanding of science or philosophy, for example, certainly seems to many people less intense concerning pleasure and yet, in some sense, higher than other, more intensely pleasurable experiences.

Hedonism seems to be self-inconsistent. The act of affirming hedonism undermines the credibility of that affirmation. If a person argues with a hedonist about some matter of fact, such as a philosophical conversation, the hedonist makes a claim about his experience. If he acts on his hedonism, then whether his claim is true or not relevant to what he should tell anyone else may reason that telling the truth is mostly often a policy that will generally lead to the most pleasure. But he may very well consider that his telling the truth in this particular case would seem not to lead to more pleasure overall, but instead that telling the truth would lead to more pain than pleasure. In other words, the hedonist cannot, consistently, have a respect for truth telling for its own sake. If he is consistent, he must view truth as merely instrumentally valuable. Therefore, if the consistent hedonist did happen to tell anyone the truth, then he would have to admit that if lying had seemed more productive of pleasure on this occasion, then he would have lied to that person. But when the hedonist argues with another person, he may not claim, in any case, that this is not his attitude to the truth. There is not a claim that he is saying what he says, not for an ulterior purpose, but he says it because he thinks it is true. Consequently, the hedonist does not have to claim, when he speaks to anyone else that he might just as well lie to that person as not, because he does not care about truth in itself. These considerations suggest that there must be some good knowledge of truth, for example—that is not confined to pleasurable experience.

Although Edwards is a qualitative hedonist, his argument against quantitative hedonism reveals a central problem in hedonism itself, of whatever type. Edwards first distinguishes between quantitative and qualitative hedonism. The quantitative hedonist, he says, holds that there is only one quality of agreeable feeling called 'pleasure' and that any two pleasures differ only quantitatively, that is, in intensity or duration. The qualitative hedonist, on the contrary, denies both these points. The qualitative hedonist holds that although only agreeable feelings are intrinsically good, some are qualitatively better than others; that is, certain pleasurable experiences cannot be outweighed by any quantity of others. Arguing against the quantitative hedonist, Edwards first points out that from the quantitative hedonist's viewpoint it follows that all goods other than the agreeable feeling referred to 'pleasure.' From this it follows that all pluralistic goods are expendable and replaceable.

If the ideal is sustained agreeable feeling during all men's wakeful moments with no disagreeable feeling intermixed, they now know that this state is attainable by merely hooking up a set of well-placed electrodes to the pleasure centers of the brain and stimulating the brain with mild electric shocks. If people knew how to sustain life and awareness for years and years with little or no physical exercise; if people had a chance, under those conditions, to consign themselves to a hospital bed attached to a well-placed set of electrodes for the next fifty or sixty years of their life, but with no other type of human activity, experience, or fulfillment, it is questionable whether or not people would take it. Most of them would definitely reject such an opportunity, and, according to Edwards, reasonably so; moreover, people would decline the option not just out of moral considerations, but centrally on the basis of what they study to be constitutive of what is genuinely worthwhile. These facts show that the sheer quantity of pleasure is not the only rational consideration. This conclusion, instead, proves that such facts refute quantitative hedonism, but not qualitative hedonism. There would be the rejection of electronic happiness as fully adequate, but still a qualitative hedonism, for there are important, qualitatively higher experiences that the electrodes cannot produce. Non-localized pleasures, or the higher pleasures, are normally not obtainable in isolation from the activity or context that causes them, people are never in a position to contemplate the worth of a pure pleasure either in experience, thought, or imagination. There is no one quality of agreeable feeling that would count as pure pleasure, and intentional pleasures are not available to men in total isolation from their objects.

But one considers that the electrodes could offer such experiences, or a set of electrodes could offer men the experience of philosophical creativity, of a happy marriage and family, of beautiful music. "Given the prospect of uninterrupted enjoyment of such an electronically simulated universe at least during men's leisure time, and the assurance that no one in the real world would ever be hurt by his enjoyment of it" (qtd. in. Lee and George 106), people might not be logically constrained to choose the life of the human electrode operator on qualitatively hedonistic grounds. Principally it may be possible but practically impossible.

This answer brings to light the dualistic presuppositions of hedonism, qualitative as well as quantitative, and of purely hedonistic choices. For the point made about quantitative hedonism applies equally to qualitative hedonism: if the only intrinsic good is an agreeable feeling, then whatever the source or object of that feeling is, this source is, in principle, dispensable. This means that, based on hedonism, qualitative as well as quantitative, every desirable end other than feelings including knowledge, friendship, or a virtue, is replaceable: if another device could produce the feelings or experience of such knowledge, such as friendship, or virtue, then this device would be objectively preferable. Thus, pleasure is good, but only if it is part of, or a consequence of, a genuinely fulfilling activity or condition. Sadistic pleasures, for example, are disordered and so are not good.

Moreover, in every hedonistic choice, that is, in every choice to pursue mere experience as detached from the larger real perfection of which it may be a part, this same reduction of real goods, such as knowledge, friendship, life, virtue, to the level of mere expendable and replaceable sources of agreeable feeling is enacted. Hedonistic choices by their very nature detach one from concern, or respect, for what is really worthwhile.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Dorian Gray is a beautiful young man, who is so immature and ready to adopt a practical doctrine for his life: "he was certainly wonderfully handsome, with his finely curved scarlet lips, his frank blue eyes, and his crisp gold hair. There was something in his face that made one trust him at once. All the candor of youth was there, as well as all youth's passionate purity" (PDG 18).

As he is described by Sybil, "he is like what love himself should be" (PDG 60). His looks was what made everybody amazed. In another part of the novel, Sybil's mom describes Dorian to his son, who is worried about his sister's future in this way:

My son, you distress me very much. Sybil is always under my special care. Of course, if this gentleman is wealthy, there is no reason why she should contract an alliance with him. I trust he is one of the aristocracy. He has all the appearance of it, I must say. It might be a most brilliant marriage for Sybil. They would make a charming couple. His good looks are really quite remarkable; everybody notices them. (PDG 63)

He was so beautiful that even James Vane, without even seeing or knowing him, thought of him as a "young dandy" and a "gentleman" (PDG 65). His beautiful face was recognizable and remembered by almost everyone who knew him. His face was what made him wish for an eternal youth. His lover, Sybil Vane, put his beauty in these world to get her brother's approval:

He is called Prince Charming. Don't you like the name. Oh! You silly boy! You should never forget it. If you only saw him, you would think him the most wonderful person in the world. Someday you will meet him: when you come back from Australia. You will like him so much. Everybody likes him, and I...I love him [...] he is a gentleman [...] to see him is to worship him, to know him is to trust him. (PDG 66)

His beautiful face made everybody trust him, indeed. It was what made people worship him. And it was what he saw in the portrait that Basil drew, and for the first time in his life he, himself, was astonished by his beauty. He meets a man, Lord Henry Wotton, who speaks of so many intriguing ideas and philosophies about life. Dorian introduces many ideas about pleasure, and the ultimate aim of life. He acts and is motivated based on the desires for obtaining pleasure. He chooses the way of living as a devotion to gather and seek as much pleasure as he can for himself. Lord Henry opens to him the door of a new world, in which Dorian drowns himself.

He is a simple lovable young man who has no idea about what he is going to become at the beginning of the novel. He is transformed into a self-centered hedonist, who only acts based on his desires to obtain pleasure. He has an endless life, which is given to him because of a wish he makes. The story of his life is like a map which shows the end of seeking and practically experiencing all kinds of pleasures.

This type of hedonism can be traced from the very beginning of this novel. From the moment Dorian is to know the new hedonism, as Lord Henry introduces it, Dorian is motivated by his desire for seeking pleasure, and pleasure alone can satisfy his desire. He remembers it like this:

The curiosity about life which Lord Henry had first stirred in him, as they sat together in the garden of their friend, seemed to increase with gratification. The more he knew, the more he desired to know. He had mad hungers that grew more ravenous as he fed them. (PDG 200)

He begins to be drawn into a new world, which was full of fantasy and pleasure. From that moment on he could only think of pleasure, particularly getting those kinds of pleasure that one cannot even think of. He tries to feed his mad hunger in whatever way he thought he could. Dorian is following psychological hedonism when he wished for an eternal youth under the influence of Lord Henry in a crazy moment. He made such a wish based on the motivation to have a good life. That is what has been said as a motto of psychological hedonism:

How sad it is! I shall grow old, and horrible, and dreadful. But this picture will remain always young. It will never be older than this particular day of June [...] if it were only the other way! If it were I who was to be always young, and this picture that was to grow old! For that [...] for that [...] I would give everything! Yes, there is nothing in the whole world I would not give! I would give my soul for that. (PDG 27-28)

He wants to be young so that he can obtain whatever pleasure he has a desire for. This psychological point of view gives shape to all his actions. This is what motivates him to obtain as much pleasure as he can. He is a psychological hedonist, when he falls in love with Sibyl Vane. Based on the motivation and desire he takes in watching the greatest plays of all time which come into life, right before his eyes. Sybil is described by Dorian in this psychological hedonistic point of view:

She is absolutely and entirely divine. Every night of my life I go to see her act, and every night she is more marvelous [...] she is all the heroines of the world in one. She is more than an individual [...] I want to make Romeo jealous. I want the dead lovers of the world to hear our laughter, and grow sad [...] she will make the world as mad as she has made me [...] I have never been so happy [...] it seems to me to be the one thing I have been looking for all my life [...] she is simply a born artist. I sat in the dingy box absolutely enthralled. I forgot that I was in London in the nineteenth century [...] when she acts you will forget everything. (PDG 47-48)

She has a psychological hedonistic point of view to make Dorian come and experience one of the best and highest sorts of pleasure. He is not only motivated by her in a hedonistic way, but also desires to own her as a source of a fine, pure and beautiful kind of pleasure.

Therefore, when Sibyl does not make this happen after some time, this psychological hedonist, who knows that he will not be able to experience such a pleasure anymore, breaks up with her, because there is nothing left there, which can be thought as a desire for pleasure. Thus the psychological hedonistic point of view makes him hate her. This can be seen in the way he speaks with Sybil or talks about her:

How badly I acted tonight Dorian! She cried. Horribly! He answered, gazing at her in amazement—horribly! It was dreadful. Are you ill? You have no idea what it was. You have no idea what I suffered [...] you have killed my love [...] you used to stir my imagination. Now you don't even stir my curiosity. You simply produce no effect. I loved you because you were marvelous, because you had genius and intellect, because you realized the dreams of the great poets and gave shape and substance to the shadows of art. You have thrown it all away. You are shallow and stupid. My God! How mad I was to love you! What a fool I have been! You are nothing to me now. I will never see you again [...] you have spoiled the romance of my life [...]. Without your art you are nothing. (PDG 82)

He is very much upset and disappointed. That is one of the plain reasons that can be mentioned as a psychological hedonism. Because he acts on the basis of the motivation to seek pleasure and she is no longer the source of it.

He takes psychological hedonism through watching the picture which changes overtime and is motivated to do dreadful things, in order to watch the changes in the picture. As psychological hedonism shows one acts based on the motivation or desire for pleasure. Actually, in those particular moments, he gets psychological hedonistic pleasure from watching the portrait to become more and more corrupted:

Often, on returning home from one of those mysterious and prolonged absences that gave rise to such strange conjecture among those who were his friends, or thought that they were so, he himself would creep upstairs to the locked room, open the door with the key that never left him now, and stand, with a mirror, in front of the portrait that Basil Hallward had painted of him, looking now at the evil and aging face on the canvas, and now at the fair young face that laughed back at him from the polished glass. The very sharpness of the contrast used to quicken his sense of pleasure. He grew more and more enamoured of his own beauty, more and more interested in the corruption of his own beauty, more and more interested in the corruption of his own soul. He would examine with minute care, and sometimes with a monstrous and terrible delight, the hideous lines that seared the wrinkling forehead or crawled around the heavy sensual mouth. (*PDG* 120)

It can be considered as a dilemma. But what is finally gained is psychological hedonism. Because all his actions and behaviors have taken form based on the motivation to have as much pleasure as he can. He is motivated to go to the opium dens as a place which can help him satisfy his desires for seeking pleasure. He studies about so many things, and he does so because he is motivated by the desire of obtaining pleasure in doing so. May be he was not aware that he is a psychological hedonist.

Dorian Gray is an absolutely ethical hedonist. Because first of all the terms he knows and strives for is a kind of pleasure or a means of producing it as ethical hedonism asserts. He acts for the sake of producing maximum pleasure for himself, and himself alone. He has the time he needs. Therefore, he acts based on seeking pleasure in his life to the fullest. All his actions and behaviors are either to gather pleasure, or the means of obtaining it. He is an absolute ethical hedonist, simply because he wants to stay young so that he can get as much pleasure as he desires for. He wants a continuous and an endless youth as a means of maximizing pleasure in his life.

CONCLUSION

Oscar Wilde represents to everyone a character transformed so beautifully into a psychological and ethical Hedonist, whose all ideas, actions, behaviors and desires are based on seeking pleasure. Dorian Gray, the live example of living hedonism in his life, tries his best to obtain as much psychological and ethical hedonism as one can get. Given the time he needed he does his best to do so. In the end he dies unsatisfied as a result.

He unconsciously fulfills all his psychological and ethical hedonistic desires. He did whatever a man can do to achieve the psychological and ethical Hedonistic success in his life which could be endless because of his pleasure-seeking tendency and wish. Indeed, his wish is to satisfy his aesthetic, enthusiastic as well as passionate desires, because he makes it out of motivation by the various desires of pleasure.

In this sense, his wish is an ethical hedonism, because he wants to have as much time as one can get to produce maximum amount of pleasure for himself. He wishes that he could have an eternal youth of exploring the world of pleasure he was not familiar with. He, undeniably, behaves and acts simply based on the fact that he sees everything as a means by which he can produce the maximum amount of pleasure.

REFERENCES

- Audi R. 1999. *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Bloom H. 2008. *Bloom's Classic Critical Views: Oscar Wilde*. New York: Bloom's Literary Criticism.
Feldman F. 2010. *What is this Thing Called Happiness?* New York: Oxford UP.
Sumner LW. 2003. *Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics*. New York: Oxford UP.
Watson J. 1895. *Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer*. London: James Macle Hose and Sons.
Wilde O. 2005. *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. New York: A Bantam Book.